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Interpreting Copyright Law and Internet Facts
Cameron Hutchison*
INTRODUCTION
This paper probes interpretation issues elicited by the impact of digital tech-
nologies and the Internet on copyright law. The purpose of the paper is to instill a
coherent framework for analyzing copyright law when it encounters Internet or dig-
ital facts. In part one, I propose a methodology of statutory interpretation that helps
suitably adapt statutory language to technological developments. In essence it is
this: courts should examine the language of the operative provision in its statutory
context and in light of its purpose. A contextual interpretation of a broadly con-
ceived rule can reveal a legislative intention that certain kinds of activities or things
are to be included, even with respect to unforeseen technologies. More importantly
with respect to new technologies, courts must always be ready to recalibrate the
purpose behind a rule, i.e., to rebalance the interests inherent (and in some cases
external) to the rule in way that seems most reasonable all things considered.
In part two, I introduce the reader to the challenges posed by Internet technol-
ogy in connection with the interpretation of copyright law. While courts tend to
treat the Internet as functionally the same as other technologies in most instances
and proceed to analogize the facts before them with precedent cases, this approach
on its own is not particularly effective. Rather, courts must always be attuned to the
purpose behind a rule to help ensure the most appropriate application. Moreover,
courts need to be cognizant that the nature of the Internet presents both external and
internal perspectives of the facts. When courts relate the purpose of a rule to In-
ternet or digital facts, they need to take into account both perspectives to ensure an
interpretation that appropriately balances inherent and, where applicable, affected
interests.
In part three, I apply the analysis and above methodology to three cases to
help illustrate my thesis. The Supreme Court of Canada’s analysis of the section 2.4
safe harbour is an excellent illustration of how courts accommodate interests inher-
ent and external to the rule in question. The MP3 case, on the other hand, presents
as an example of how the Federal Court of Appeal failed to apply a purposive
analysis and thus came to an unconvincing interpretive result. Perhaps most intrigu-
ingly, the Robertson case is discussed as an example of how the legal issue in dis-
pute dictates the perspective of the facts that is adopted.
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In this part, a methodology of statutory interpretation for adapting broadly
conceived language to new technological developments is presented and then illus-
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trated with reference to the Théberge case and section 3 rights under the Copyright
Act.
(a) A Methodology
Canadian courts typically apply a purposive approach to interpretation, mean-
ing that the language of the rule is to be understood in its ordinary sense principally
in light of its context and purpose.1 The starting point for statutory analysis is to
attempt a tentative understanding of the language in question.2 In many cases, and
particularly when broad language is used, this language will give rise to either dif-
ferent possible meanings or at least uncertainty at the fringes as to whether an ac-
tivity or thing falls under the rule.3 A purposive approach to statutory interpreta-
tion, i.e., analyzing the ordinary language of the rule in light of its context and
purpose, can instill a measure of precision using techniques which may help un-
cover a meaning consistent with the legislative intent and purpose of the rule. What
this means, in a general sense, is that reasonable inferences are being made from a
reading of the statute as a whole.
Context is a reference to other language in the statute which helps to inform
and shape the meaning of language in question.4 This language may be in the im-
1 This approach is best captured in the Driedger principle which is often referenced by
Canadian courts: “. . .the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context, in their
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of
the Act, and the intention of Parliament.” See Ruth Sullivan and Elmer A. Driedger,
Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Vancouver: But-
teworths, 2002) [Sullivan] at 1. All of these elements are present in the methodology I
propose. I include scheme and intention under what I propose for “context of the stat-
ute”. The Supreme Court has seemingly also decided to simplify the analysis along
similar lines: see Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. R., 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R.
601 (S.C.C.) at para. 10, where a textual, contextual and purposive analysis is adopted.
2 All approaches to statutory interpretation unite on this point. Where they diverge is in
what other considerations, if any, help shape or modify initial understandings of the
language.
3 With respect to the latter, H.L.A. Hart referred to this phenomenon as penumbral
meaning. According to him, there are standard instances which fall within the core
meaning of the rule; conversely, there are cases which are at the fringes, in which case
interpreters need to determine whether that activity is sufficiently similar in material
respects with the core rules to be included: see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2d
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) [Hart] at 126-7. Lon L. Fuller conceptual-
ized the interpretation of statutory rules differently. He rejected the idea of standard
instances but understood meaning in an abstract sense, i.e., as identifying some signifi-
cance in human affairs to be regulated by the rule. The concrete manifestations of that
rule are to be determined at the point of application by considering the purpose of the
rule and whether a particular interpretation is consistent with practices and attitudes in
society. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1964) at 84; Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law — A Reply to Professor
Hart” (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 [Fuller, “Fidelity”] at 664; Lon L. Fuller, Anatomy
of the Law (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968) [Fuller, Anatomy] at 59.
4 Context, according to Driedger, is multifaceted in that it includes the literary context
(the immediate context and the Act as a whole including its scheme), legal context
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mediate context of the provision in question or, indeed, other sections of the statute.
The ordinary meaning of the rule “no vehicles in the park” may be unclear at the
fringes (does it include bicycles?) until we look at another provision in the act (the
context) which states that “bicycles in the park shall stay on designated trails”. Bi-
cycles being thus regulated, they are allowed in the park and are not intended to be
included as a vehicle under the prohibition. Closely related to this is legislative
intent as inferred by the Legislature’s choice of language.5 We may glean a general
intent behind a careful examination of statutory wording. If “no guns, fireworks or
similar items are allowed in the park” is the rule we may infer a legislative intent
that potentially dangerous items are prohibited in the park.6 As well, we may infer
that the Legislature has delegated to the courts the manner in which “similar items”
is to be interpreted.
Purpose refers to the reason behind a rule.7 So, while the legislative intent of
the above rule is to prevent dangerous items from entering the park, the purpose
may to protect human health and safety. Purpose is perhaps the most malleable of
factors that is employed in a purposive analysis. In one sense, this is because it
operates a high level of abstraction, i.e., does the purpose of protecting human
(substantive law) and external context (how the legislation works in the real world).
More precisely, the immediate context consists of the provision in which the words
appear, closely related provisions, as well as the entire statute as amended. The legal
context refers to extant substantive law that may shed light on legislative intent, com-
prised of the statute book as a whole including related legislation, relevant case law, the
common law and international law. External context is concerned with the “setting in
which [the enacted law] currently operates.” The assumption is that legislation “is a
response to circumstances in the real world and it necessarily operates within an evolv-
ing set of institutions, relationships and cultural assumptions.” See Sullivan, supra note
1, at 260–2. For the purposes of my proposed analysis, I would equate external context
with a consideration of the purpose of (or interest balancing behind) the rule.
5 Legislative intent may be conceived in a specific sense, i.e., what was the specific in-
tention of this provision or statute as revealed by the lawmakers themselves, or in a
purposive sense, i.e., what mischief in general terms was the Legislature concerned
with remedying? See William N. Eskridge, Philip P. Frickey and Elizabeth Garrett,
Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, 2d ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2006) at
221. In Canada, courts have generally eschewed specific intent, preferring to glean leg-
islative intent objectively from the language, scheme and/or purpose of the Act. Spe-
cific intent is particularly unhelpful for new technologies which are not envisaged at
the time of the creation of the rule. This will be illustrated when we look at the MP3
case below.
6 This is an application of the maxim ejusdem generis:that general wording is to be in-
formed by the more specific wording that precedes it. Statutory maxims can be particu-
larly effective at fleshing out legislative intent. Since the source of determining objec-
tive legislative intent is the language of the statute, I choose to combine legislative
intent and context under the heading “context.”
7 The “object of the Act” refers to its purpose, i.e., legislation is presumed to have a
discoverable purpose, which should be furthered, or at least not defeated, by a given
interpretation. Purpose goes to both the Act as a whole and the specific provision. See
Sullivan, supra note 1, at 195–8. The purpose of an Act may be stated in the preamble
though, more typically, it is divined through judicial interpretation.
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health and safety mean that a carving knife is a “similar item” that cannot be
brought into the park? The purpose is too abstract to resolve the issue in any defi-
nite sense. In resolving this kind of case, and in the absence of a context revealing
an intended meaning, courts should resolve this interpretive ambiguity by balancing
the interests involved the best that it can, i.e., the interest in allowing people to use
carving knives for a picnic and the safety hazard of the knife causing an accident or
being used for an improper purpose.8 A sensible interpretation would probably cali-
brate the balance at allowing people to bring the knife into the park given the legiti-
macy of its intended use. A gun or fireworks being more dangerous than a carving
knife, and carving knife having a legitimate function within the park, the purpose of
health and safety would not be undermined by allowing the knife into the park.
However, notice that a judgment is being made as to how an initial purpose is
balanced and modified against competing considerations, i.e., the community’s en-
joyment of the park; in other words, the purpose of the statute is constantly being
recalibrated every time novel fact situations present themselves to courts.
The methodology I prescribe is as follows: first, courts should employ a full
purposive analysis of a rule in the first instance, i.e., considering the language at
issue in its context and light of its purpose. In some cases, a close reading of the
statutory language will reveal inferences as to whether a kind of activity was in-
tended to be covered by a rule or not. In many cases, this will not resolve the inter-
pretive difficulty. Courts then must attempt to calibrate the inherent and affected
interests of a rule according to a balance that seems most reasonable to them.
(b) Copyright Law
Copyright gives the author of an original expressive work, e.g., expression in a
book or in a painting, the exclusive right to produce the work in another derivative
form, e.g., produce the book into movie, and to make copies in both its original and
derivate form(s). These rights are outlined in section 3 of the Copyright Act: 
3. (1) For the purposes of this Act, “copyright”, in relation to a work, means
the sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part
thereof in any material form whatever, to perform the work or any substan-
tial part thereof in public or, if the work is unpublished, to publish the work
or any substantial part thereof, and includes the sole right
(a) to produce, reproduce, perform or publish any translation of
the work,
(b) in the case of a dramatic work, to convert it into a novel or
other non-dramatic work,
(c) in the case of a novel or other non-dramatic work, or of an
artistic work, to convert it into a dramatic work, by way of per-
formance in public or otherwise,
(d) in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work, to make
8 Hart argued that the apparent purpose behind a rule may be modified by new interests
that need to be accommodated by the rule: see Hart, supra note 3, at 129. Fuller ad-
vanced that the purpose of a statute is not static but through interpretation, courts en-
gage in a process of redefining and clarifying the ends themselves: see Fuller, “Fidel-
ity”, supra note 3, at 668.
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any sound recording, cinematograph film or other contrivance by
means of which the work may be mechanically reproduced or
performed,
(e) in the case of any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work,
to reproduce, adapt and publicly present the work as a cinemato-
graphic work,
(f) in the case of any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work,
to communicate the work to the public by telecommunication,
(g) to present at a public exhibition, for a purpose other than sale
or hire, an artistic work created after June 7, 1988, other than a
map, chart or plan,
(h) in the case of a computer program that can be reproduced in
the ordinary course of its use, other than by a reproduction dur-
ing its execution in conjunction with a machine, device or com-
puter, to rent out the computer program, and
(i) in the case of a musical work, to rent out a sound recording in
which the work is embodied,
and to authorize any such acts. [Emphasis added.]
When courts employ broad language such as “produce” or “reproduce”, as em-
phasized above, we may presume an intention by the Legislature for courts to de-
velop the meaning of the provision at the point of application.9 This institutional
delegation reflects the impossibility of prescribing in advance all specific acts or
things that are intended to be captured by a rule.10 However, the discretion of the
court in exercising the delegated discretion is not unfettered. Courts must look to
the statute as a whole to uncover clues about legislative intention and purpose.
Thus, courts can develop principled meaning from open-ended language when, as
in section 3, context reveals an intention to include certain kinds of activities under
the rule but not others. Thus when a more specific subset of production and repro-
duction rights are enumerated, we look to the nature of those rights to determine
commonalities in an effort to uncover the intention behind the words “produce” and
“reproduce.” We then compare those commonalities with the activity or thing in
question to see if, in material respects, it is the same or different. As we will see
later on, the context of section 3 is an indispensible guide to extracting a more
9 Randal N. Graham, Statutory Interpretation: Theory and Practice (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 2001) at 126. See also Cameron Hutchison “Which Kraft of Statutory
Interpretation: A Supreme Court of Canada Trilogy on Intellectual Property Law”
(2008) 46 Alta. L. Rev. at 2:
Superficially, statutes are threadbare vessels of communication. They
attempt to regulate complex areas of human activity with relative lin-
guistic brevity. Rules may be vaguely worded so as to encompass, in
an abstract sense, a broad range of subject matter . . . Presumptions are
often employed by courts to flesh out and maximize statutory meaning
. . . We may further enhance statutory meaning when we recognize
that linguistic devices such as vague language represent a delegation
of interpretive function from the Legislature to the judiciary.
10 Hart, supra note 3, at 128; Fuller “Anatomy”, supra note 3, at 106.
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precise meaning of the right to “produce” and “reproduce.”
It is often the case that a statute will use vague language but without contex-
tual guidance as to a more exact meaning of the provision. Thus, for example, the
right to “authorize any such acts” at the end of section 3 is not more exactly in-
formed by either the immediate context or the statute as a whole. When that hap-
pens, courts will generally be more reliant on precedent and statutory purpose. But
these are inexact guides which will leave more discretion to courts as to whether
the activity is included or excluded.
The purpose of the Copyright Act is as follows: 
“The Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance between promoting the
public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts
and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator (or, more accurately,
to prevent someone other than the creator from appropriating whatever be-
nefits may be generated).”11
This purpose reveals a balance between incentive (or just rewards) to create and
access to those creations. Courts can only interpret vague language in light of such
a purpose by trying to calibrate an appropriate balance between competing interests
in view of facts of the case. On occasion, interests outside the rule will also have to
be considered and possibly accommodated.
I will now illustrate these elements of a purposive interpretation by consider-
ing the case of Théberge v. Galerie d’Art.12 Claude ThébergeThéberge, a renowned
Quebec artist, brought this action for copyright infringement against subsequent
assignees of a contract authorizing poster copies of his paintings. The issue in this
case was whether the transfer of the poster painting from a paper to canvas sub-
strate (something not specifically addressed in the contract) by the subsequent as-
signees infringed Théberge’s section 3 right to produce or reproduce the work. Sig-
nificantly, the process did not involve the creation of new copies, only the transfer
of ink from one substrate (paper) to another (canvas).
The majority judgment, authored by Mr. Justice Binnie, held that there was no
infringement on these facts. Denying any independent right of production under the
Act,13 the focus of the decision was on whether or not the right to reproduce was
infringed. Here, the majority reasoned that the transfer to a new substrate did not
constitute infringement because there was no reproduction, i.e., no new copies were
made. Put simply, copyright infringement requires the act of unauthorized copy-
ing.14 Even the act of making a derivate work — say taking the artistic drawing of
cartoon character and making a doll out of it — involves a reproduction or “new
copies or manifestations of the work,” according to this analysis.15 The purpose of
the Copyright Act, reproduced above, helped direct the result. Emphasizing this
11 Galerie d’art du Petit Champlain inc. c. Théberge, 2002 SCC 34, [2002] 2 S.C.R.
336 (S.C.C.), [Théberge] at para. 30.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. at para. 48.
14 Ibid. at para. 42.
15 Ibid. at para. 49. In obiter, Binnie comments at para. 41 that “a change in substrate
could, as part of a more extensive set of changes, amount to a reproduction in a new
form (perhaps, for example, if the respondent’s work were incorporated by the ink
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need for balance between creator rights and user rights, the majority interpreted the
right of the copyright holder narrowly. Binnie asks “[b]ut in what way has the legit-
imate economic interests of the copyright holder been infringed? The process began
with a single poster and ended up with a single poster.”16
The interpretive dilemma confronting the court in Théberge is whether the act
of changing the substrate of authorized poster reproductions constituted infringe-
ment of the owner’s right to produce or reproduce the work. There is no indication
in these general terms whether changing the background of authorized reproduc-
tions of a work engages either right. The case challenges the court to determine the
fringes of meaning associated with this bare expression of broadly conceived
rights. To resolve this interpretive dilemma, Binnie interprets the language with
reference to the statute’s purpose, as he conceives it. The need to balance creator
rights with user rights (here, purchaser rights), in his opinion, justifies reading
down the rights of a copyright holder. Specifically, the “legitimate economic inter-
ests” of the copyright holder are not impacted by the subsequent assignee’s chang-
ing of the substrate.
In my opinion, the issue in Théberge was whether the right to produce was
engaged, i.e., a derivative work of the original was made, since no new copies were
made and thus there was no reproduction of the work. In other words, did this
change in substrate amount to a new production of the work? If we look at specific
manifestations of that right in subparagraphs (a) to (i) of section 3, we might con-
clude that the right to produce is more transformative in form, or qualitatively dif-
ferent in the method of communication, than merely changing the substrate. For
example, the production right is engaged by making translations of a work, or by
converting a dramatic work into a novel or vice versa.17 In terms of mode of com-
munication, the right involves communicating by telecommunication.18 By analo-
gizing the facts in Théberge with existing rights of production which we know were
intended to comprise a copyright holder’s bundle of rights, we extrapolate the kinds
of rights that should be accorded a copyright holder according to the intent of the
Legislature. The interpretive issue in Théberge should have been resolved through
a purposive analysis, specifically with reference to the immediate context of section
3. Rather unusually in this case, the vagueness of the right in question was supple-
mented with specific manifestations in the statute. These examples serve as stan-
dard instance cases through which the court could have analogized whether chang-
ing the substrate of a work engaged the right to produce.
transfer method into some other artist’s original work) but the present case does not
rise to that level.”
16 Ibid. at para. 38.
17 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, ss. 3(1)(b) and (c).
18 Ibid. s. 3(1)(f).
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II. INTERNET FACTS
At the most general level, the “Internet is a worldwide network of intercon-
nected computers.”19 Computers are able to communicate with each other (or in the
technical sense, send and receive packets of data) instantaneously by means of a
common protocol in which each computer has a unique Internet address. Individu-
als are able to create, store, and access vast amounts of information through user-
friendly software. Digitization, which has accompanied the Internet, permits the
conversion and storage of mass amounts of data with relative ease. This digitized
information may be easily communicated and accessed through high bandwidth
distribution.20 This very basic explanation of the workings of the Internet and digi-
tization offers a small flavour of the revolutionary nature of these technologies.
Through user-friendly software applications, people around the world are able to
communicate and transmit information with each other for all kinds of purposes
immediately and on a massive scale.
Canadian courts have responded to Internet technology by treating it as func-
tionally the same as other “real space” technologies like TV, radio, the telephone,
or a host of others.21 In cases where there is precedent interpreting a rule, courts
tend to assume a kind of functional equivalence between the Internet and other
relevant technologies and have proceeded to analogize Internet facts with real space
precedent. My point in this part of the paper is to suggest that analogical reasoning
on its own is an inappropriate way to correlate Internet facts with precedent inter-
pretation of a rule. Rather, courts must be attuned to the purpose behind the rule
prior to assessing whether the Internet facts are, in the relevant material respects,
sufficiently similar. Moreover, new technologies, like the Internet, may affect inter-
ests that were not in play when a prior interpretation was laid down. Courts, in
those circumstances, may need to interpret the rule differently so as to accommo-
date newly affected interests. To complicate matters more, the Internet presents in-
terpreters with two perspectives of the facts, an internal and external perspective,
and the outcome of a case often depends on which perspective is chosen or
emphasized.
19 Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of
Internet Providers (1999), 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417 at 425 (Copyright Bd.); reversed 2002
CarswellNat 964, 2002 CarswellNat 965 (Fed. C.A.); leave to appeal allowed 2003
CarswellNat 738, 2003 CarswellNat 739 (S.C.C.); reversed 2004 CarswellNat 1919,
2004 CarswellNat 1920 (S.C.C.).
20 Ibid.
21 The author is currently conducting an empirical analysis of judicial interpretation of
law and the internet in the legal areas of copyright, defamation and privacy. After re-
viewing all internet cases in each of these areas, my general impression (which I am
confident will later be substantiated when the data is analyzed) is that courts and tribu-
nals typically do not explicitly acknowledge that the internet is different but merely
treat is any other medium. For example, see British Columbia Automobile Assn. v.
O.P.E.I.U., Local 378, 2001 BCSC 156, [2001] 4 W.W.R. 95 (B.C. S.C.), in which the
court applies copyright’s substantial takings doctrine by comparing the look of the two
websites in question. As this example shows, functional equivalence is often times
appropriate.
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(a) Analogy
Courts often analogize precedent case law with the facts of a dispute to deter-
mine whether an activity is within or outside of a rule, but without considering the
rule’s purpose. This is inappropriate for any interpretive exercise. Let’s return to
the “no guns, fireworks, or similar items are allowed in the park” rule as applied to
the carving knife. As an interpreter, I must have some conception of the purpose of
the rule before I can appropriately apply it to the facts. Otherwise, I might identify
certain features or attributes of guns and fireworks, such as both use gunpowder
(which is flammable) and find that a carving knife is allowed but butane lighter is
not. However, if I look at the purpose of the rule, and identify it to be the safety of
persons in the park, then butane lighters would be permitted and carving knives
would be suspect (though as I reasoned above, probably allowable).22 The purpose,
in other words, alerts the interpreter to which features of the facts are relevant to
the rule in question.
We must be particularly sensitive to the purpose behind the rule, together with
new interests brought into play, when we confront new technologies like the In-
ternet.23 Internet technology, in some of its features, has no precedent. There are
real differences of kind or degree which demand that courts at the very least adapt
established rules.24 Consider, for example, the massive scale of dissemination of
22 See Fuller “Fidelity” supra note 3 at 664.
23 When courts analogize with precedent cases without considering the rule’s purpose
they may nonetheless reach a result consistent a purposive analysis. In Canadian
Wireless Telecommunications Assn. v. Society of Composers, Authors & Music
Publishers of Canada, 2008 FCA 6, [2008] 3 F.C.R. 539 (F.C.A.); leave to appeal
refused 2008 CarswellNat 3234, 2008 CarswellNat 3235 (S.C.C.), the court compared
internet transmissions to facsimile technology (as per authoritative precedent in CCH
Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339
(S.C.C.) [CCH], to assist in determining whether the downloading of ringtones was a
communication “to the public” under s. 3(1)(f). The court noted that both technologies
can be used to send information to multiple recipients, and thus ringtone downloading
on the internet fits within the rule. There was no consideration of the purpose of the
rule though it seems clear that to heed the argument, as presented in that case, that
downloading on the internet occurs individually and in private settings and thus the
posting of ringtones is not to the public would eviscerate the substance of the right in a
way that could not be justified in view of the fact that many telecommunication tech-
nologies operate in the same way, e.g., television. In other words, there was no purpo-
sive rationale (whether it be the balancing competing interests within the rule or con-
sideration of external interests) to suggest that the internet should be treated differently
than other telecommunication technologies.
24 Some of these differences include: internet communications consist of data in multiple
places at once, and not in one “real space” place; bandwidth is effectively infinite com-
pared with the physical limitations of real space; lack of proximity in cyberspace be-
tween cause and effects compared with real space; information is non exhaustible and
non rivalrous as compared with physical property and places; instantaneous transmis-
sion of perfect reproductions at zero marginal cost; the ease and massive scale of trans-
mission of information; Information can cross international borders without detection.
See Cameron Hutchison, “Interpretation and the Internet” C.I.P.R. 28:2] John Marshall
Journal of Computer and Information Law (forthcoming).
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information, including copyrighted works, through the Internet as compared with
antecedent technologies. This feature of Internet communication may be the basis
for departing from previous interpretations on the basis of advancing the rule’s pur-
pose. One issue in the SOCAN case was whether ISPs that provide host servers to
music copyright infringers may be held liable for “authorizing” copyright infringe-
ment. Precedent established that control over the infringer was determinative of
authorization liability (which an ISP has over its customer’s host server).25 How-
ever, in the Internet context, the court in obiter suggested that knowledge of the
infringing activity by the ISP may be a more appropriate trigger. A different appli-
cation of the rule was applied to the Internet as a means of accommodating a mate-
rial difference (the difficulty of monitoring massive amounts of information by
ISPs) which implicated an external interest (low cost Internet services). Both mani-
festations of this authorization rule are nonetheless consistent with the purpose: to
establish liability of third parties who are indifferent to infringement when it is
reasonably within their means to do something about it.
Courts which are not sensitive to the purpose of a rule and the differences of
kind and degree inherent to the Internet run the risk of misapplying the rule to the
Internet activity in question by either straying from the original purpose of the rule
or not considering newly affected interests implicated by the technology.
(b) Perspective
Given the number of “layers” to Internet technology, it is possible that Internet
activity may be conceptualized in a myriad of ways resulting in different perspec-
tives on the facts. In an important work, Orin Kerr described the legal significance
of this phenomenon.26 According to Kerr, we can only apply the law once we are
apprised of the Internet facts, and these facts really depend on whether an external
or internal perspective is taken. The external perspective looks at the Internet in a
technical sense, i.e., as a physical network and “we apply law to the Internet by
applying the law to the electronic transactions underlying the network’s opera-
tion.”27 The internal perspective, on the other hand, views the Internet as “window
to a virtual world that is roughly analogous to the physical world of real space.”28
Thus, we try to “map the physical world of real space onto the virtual world of
25 The Supreme Court analyzed this right in two 2004 cases — CCH, supra note 23, and
SOCAN v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers, infra note 34. In both cases,
authorize was defined as “sanction, approve and countenance.” Also, both cases em-
phasized that this right will not be infringed by merely offering the use of technology,
without more, that will facilitate infringement. There is a presumption, in other words,
that “a person who authorizes an activity does so only so far as it is in accordance with
the law” (CCH at para. 38). But the similarity between the holdings in the two cases
ends there. In CCH, the trigger for authorization was whether there was control be-
tween the infringer and putative authorizer, e.g., an employment relationship. In SO-
CAN, authorization turned on whether an ISP has knowledge of the infringing activity
but chooses to do nothing about it.
26 Orin S. Kerr, “The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law” (2003) 91 Geo. L.J. 357.
27 Ibid. at 361.
28 Ibid. at 359-60.
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cyberspace.”29 Kerr provides the vivid example of the MP3.com case.30 In this
case, the external perspective instructs that the copying of music files onto servers
and to computers as a space shift for consumers who had already purchased the
CD, would be viewed as copyright infringement, i.e., technically a new copy of the
copyrighted work is made. However, the fact that the music had already been pur-
chased may, through an internal perspective, be more suggestive of a legitimate,
non-infringing activity.31 Kerr further suggests that legal doctrine may (though not
always) indicate which perspective interpreters should be attuned to.
However, Brett Frischmann argues that courts should resist adopting a choice
of perspective; rather, each perspective of the Internet facts should be considered,
otherwise courts may only appreciate “a partial view of the underlying facts.”32
When that happens, misleading analogies with real space may emerge which mask
other legal issues that would be revealed under a fuller and robust appreciation of
the facts. Frischmann thus prescribes the following methodology: 
First, we should recognize both perspectives provide valid and accurate ren-
ditions of the underlying facts; second, we must carefully examine the set of
interests at stake in a given dispute; and third, we must engage in a princi-
pled application of relevant legal doctrines designed to address such
interests.33
Frischmann’s argument has intuitive appeal. Why adopt either perspective exclu-
sively and risk ignoring interests that emerge from a holistic appreciation of the
facts? Such interests may need to be accommodated under the interpretation of a
rule.
The Copyright Act typically describes rights in broad language which does not
suggest a particular perspective. However, a purposive analysis favours an appreci-
ation of all interests affected by a rule and thus Frischmann is probably right that
we should not limit ourselves to one perspective or the other. As we will see in the
next section, the best interpretations consider both perspectives. When a legal ques-
tion forces a court to adopt a particular perspective, however, it usually has a deter-
29 Ibid. at 361.
30 As Kerr notes at 378-79:
In 2000, MP3.com began offering Internet users a service that allowed
them to access their compact disc (CD) collections from anywhere in
the world via the Internet. To enjoy the service, users needed to regis-
ter and establish that they owned a particular collection of CDs . . .
Registered users could then log on to mymp3.com and request specific
songs . . . The owners of MP3.com provided this service by buying
tens of thousands of copyrighted compact discs, and then copying
them onto MP3.com’s servers. Whenever a registered user would re-
quest a particular song, MP3.com’s servers would run off a copy of the
song from their servers and distribute it directly to the user over the
Internet.
31 Supra, note 26, at 379.
32 Brett M. Frischmann, “The Prospect of Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace” (2003)
35 Loy. U. Chicago L.J. 20 at 207.
33 Ibid. at 208.
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minative impact on the outcome of a dispute.
III. APPLICATION
In this final section, I apply the analysis and methodology presented above to
three prominent copyright law cases. The SOCAN case is exemplary of the meth-
odology of interpretation of both law and Internet facts argued above. By contrast,
the Federal Court of Canada’s interpretive approach in the MP3 case runs contrary
to a purposive analysis. Finally, the Robertson case is presented as an example of
how the legal issue in dispute directs the court to adopt one perspective of the In-
ternet facts of the Internet facts or the other, and how this perspective determines
the outcome of the case.
(a) SOCAN
In Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian
Assn. of Internet Providers,34 the performing rights collective society proposed a
tariff on Internet service providers (ISP) in connection with infringing music
downloads on the Internet. One of the issues was whether ISPs are entitled to the
safe harbour of s. 2.4(1)(b) when they engage in caching, i.e., copying downloaded
files onto ISP servers as a means of lowering cost and enhancing the speed of the
Internet.35 Section 2.4(1)(b) protects a person against s. 3(1)(f) infringement when
their “only act” is to provide “the means of telecommunication necessary for an-
other person to communicate the work [to the public] . . .” The argument by SO-
CAN was the practice of creating cache copies undertaken by ISPs was not abso-
lutely “necessary” to facilitate Internet communication and thus took this ISP
function outside of the safe harbour.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the safe harbour is not a narrow ex-
ception but should be read, like other limitations on rights under the Copyright Act,
as “an important element of the balance struck by the statutory copyright
scheme.”36 Accordingly, “necessary” in this provision is defined broadly as a
means of telecommunication “reasonably useful and proper to achieve the benefits
of enhanced economy and efficiency.”37 Were a more stringent definition of neces-
sary applied, according to the court, advances in telecommunication would be in-
hibited as the argument could always be made that old technology could have been
used to achieve the same ends.38 The practice of caching is thus held to be “neces-
sary”, falling within the safe harbour at least where the ISP is acting as a content
34 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 (S.C.C.).
35 Ibid. at para. 23.
36 Ibid. at para. 89. The Supreme Court begins its interpretive analysis with a statement of
the purpose of the Copyright Act as per Théberge. At para. 40, the court finds that the
Internet promotes these purposes, in that the “capacity of the Internet to disseminate
‘works of the arts and intellect’ is one of the great innovations of the information age.
Its use should be facilitated rather than discouraged, but should not be done unfairly at
the expense of those who created the works of art and intellect in the first place.”
37 Ibid. at para. 91.
38 Ibid. at para. 113.
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neutral “conduit”:39
In the Board’s view, the means “necessary” under s. 2.4(1)(b) were means
that were content neutral and were necessary to maximize the economy and
cost-effectiveness of the Internet “conduit”. That interpretation, it seems to
me, best promotes “the public interest in the encouragement and dissemina-
tion of works of the arts and intellect” . . . without depriving copyright own-
ers of their legitimate entitlement. The creation of a “cache” copy, after all,
is a serendipitous consequence of improvements in Internet technology, is
content neutral, and in light of s. 2.4(1)(b) of the Act ought not to have any
legal bearing on the communication between the content provider and the
end user.40
There are a number of revealing observations that must be made about this
interpretation. First, the rule in question invites an external perspective of the facts,
i.e., what are the “means . . . necessary?” The court however is not concerned only
with a technical appreciation of the Internet but as Frischmann argues should be the
case, takes stock of the Internet facts holistically. Indeed, one of those facts is a
consideration of the functional nature of the transaction suggestive of an internal
perspective, i.e., why should caching have any legal bearing on the communication
between content provider and end user? More pressing is whether the interest of
Internet economy and efficiency can and should be accommodated through the lan-
guage of the rule and the purpose that rule serves. In the court’s judgment, this is a
compelling interest extrinsic to purposes of copyright protection that needs to be
accommodated under the rule’s interpretation, if possible.
Second, the language of the provision is broad enough to accommodate this
interest since, as the Federal Court of Appeal acknowledged, there are two interpre-
tations of the word “necessary” in this context: indispensible on the one hand, and
reasonably useful on the other.41 There is nothing in the context of the Act to point
to either interpretation and thus the court can exercise its judgment to accommodate
the important interest of low cost, efficient Internet services provided it is not too
disruptive to the balance of interests underlying copyright. Thus, and thirdly, the
question becomes whether the interests behind the rule can accommodate the In-
ternet interest in way that strikes an appropriate balance. The court finds that it can,
39 That is, the ISP lacks actual knowledge of the infringing contents and can not, in the
normal course of affairs, be expected to know given the technical and financial in-
feasibility of monitoring the prodigious amount of material moving on the internet:
ibid. at para. 101.
40 Ibid. at para. 115.
41 See Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn.
of Internet Providers, 2002 FCA 166, [2002] 4 F.C. 3, ¶128 (Fed. C.A.); leave to ap-
peal allowed 2003 CarswellNat 738, 2003 CarswellNat 739 (S.C.C.); reversed 2004
CarswellNat 1919, 2004 CarswellNat 1920 (S.C.C.): The interpretive ambiguity in this
case concerns the word “necessary.” The Federal Court of Appeal rightly noted that the
word “necessary” may mean either (a) that which is “indispensible” or “essential” or
(b) “reasonably useful” or “of greater or lesser benefit or consequence.” Mr. Justice
Evans ruled that there was nothing in the context of the provision, including policy
considerations, which suggested a meaning consistent with the second and less familiar
definition: see para. 132.
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and calibrates the rule by not imposing liability under the safe harbour on these
facts (thus heeding the interests of promoting dissemination of copyrighted works,
and Internet economy and efficiency) but with the important caveat that the activity
must be content neutral (a limitation favouring copyright holders). In effect, then,
the court interprets this case in a manner consistent with the methodology advanced
in this paper: a purposive analysis of the law together with a holistic appreciation of
the Internet facts.
(b) The MP3 Case
In Canadian Private Copying Collective v. Canadian Storage Media Alli-
ance42, the Federal Court of Appeal was faced with determining the legality of
imposing a collective administration levy on MP3 players. Section 79 of the Copy-
right Act was the operative provision: 
“audio recording medium” means a recording medium, regardless of the
material form, onto which a sound recording may be reproduced and that is
of a kind ordinarily used by individual consumers for that purpose, exclud-
ing any prescribed kind of recording medium
A levy is imposed on a “blank audio recording medium” under this part of the
Act as a means of compensating copyright holders for private copies of audio re-
cordings made by consumers.43 The apparent purpose of this regime is to provide a
means of compensating rights holders given the widespread social practice of pri-
vate copying of recorded music.
The interpretive difficulty in this case was the identification of what consti-
tuted the “medium” of an MP3 player: was it the embedded memory onto which
the music was recorded or was it the MP3 player as a whole (i.e., what the court
calls the “device”)? The distinction is important because the former is not “ordina-
rily used” for recording music since embedded memory on a MP3 player is indis-
tinguishable from memory on a computer’s hard drive; the latter, on the other hand,
is ordinarily used for recording music. The Copyright Board approved a levy for
MP3 players.44 The reasoning of the Board was that, notwithstanding that embed-
ded memory in an MP3 player may be indistinguishable from memory on a com-
puter’s hard drive, the intrinsic character of the device constituted an “audio record-
ing medium” that is ordinarily used for private copying45 Further, the language of
s. 79, i.e., “regardless of material form”, was of overriding importance such that the
42 2004 FCA 424, 247 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (F.C.A.); leave to appeal refused 2005 Car-
swellNat 2075, 2005 CarswellNat 2076 (S.C.C.); leave to appeal refused 2005 Car-
swellNat 2077, 2005 CarswellNat 2078 (S.C.C.).
43 The act of reproducing an audio recording onto an “audio recording medium for private
use” does not constitute infringement: see s. 80. The levy on blank audio recording
medium is distributed to certain copyright holders: see s. 81.
44 However, it rejected a levy on recordable or rewritable DVDs, removable memory
cards and removable micro hard drives since these were not “ordinarily used” to copy
music.
45 Private Copying 2003-2004, Tariff of Levies to be Collected by CPCC, Re (2003), 28
C.P.R. (4th) 417, ¶155 (Copyright Bd.).
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levy should apply to the medium regardless of its incorporation into a device.46
At the Federal Court of Appeal, s. 79 was analyzed in two separate parts:
whether the device was (1) ordinarily used and (2) the relevance of the medium’s
physical attributes, i.e., whether incorporation of computer hard drive within a de-
vice affects its status as an audio recording medium. The focus was on the second
component. The argument of the Appellant was that the embedded memory into the
device loses its “separate identity” as an audio recording medium. The Federal
Court of Appeal held that it was incorrect to treat the context of the audio recording
medium as the defining characteristic of whether it fits within the s. 79 definition.
“The Board cannot establish a levy and determine its applicable rates by reference
to the device and yet assert that the levy is being applied to something else.”47 The
levy, according to the Federal Court of Appeal, is to be applied to the “audio re-
cording medium” which the memory does not become until it is incorporated into
the device. At the point of being embedded into the device, it no longer remains a
medium.48 Moreover, the court looked to the legislative history of the provision
and determined that Parliament’s intention was to apply the levy to media and not
the hardware that plays the media.49
The holding of the Federal Court of Appeal is not convincing from a purpo-
sive statutory analysis perspective. First, the language chosen by Parliament is ex-
ceedingly broad. In the context in which the word “medium” appears, its connota-
tion seems to be “material or technical means of artistic expression” or “something
. . . onto which information may be stored.”50 In addition, “regardless of its mate-
rial form” expands the ambit of potential subject matter even further. In the same
way that courts have interpreted similar language in section 3 to mean the Copy-
right Act is media neutral, this choice of language indicates an intention that the
word “medium” is to evolve in meaning.51 Thus, we must presume an intention
that Parliament wished to extend the levy to new media, as it develops, which is
ordinarily used for making private copies of audio recordings. The purpose of com-
pensating right holders for the widespread social practice of private copying con-
firms a meaning which captures both known and unforeseen targets (i.e., new tech-
46 Ibid. at para. 130-1: “A medium that is incorporated into a device remains a medium.”
47 Ibid. at para. 152.
48 Ibid. at para. 155.
49 The Federal Court of Appeal looks at the legislative history and finds that the section
was aimed at blank audio tapes and not at the hardware that played the music (tape
recorders). In other words, Parliament specifically intended to limit the levy to the
blank medium, not the hardware: ibid. at para. 158. As such, the MP3 player is not a
medium to which s. 79 applied. If MP3 players are to be caught by the levy, this was
for Parliament to decide, according to the Court: para. 164.
50 Merriam Websters Online Dictionary, s.v. “medium”, online: <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/medium>. See also Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v.
“medium”, online: <http://www.askoxford.com:80/concise_oed/medium>: 1 a means
by which something is expressed, communicated, or achieved. 2 a substance through
which a force or other influence is transmitted. 3 a form of storage for computer
software, such as magnetic tape or disks.
51 See e.g., Robertson (SCC), infra note 53, at para. 49.
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nologies) under the levy. Moreover, there is no reason to treat MP3 players
differently, i.e., there is no compelling interest to accommodate through a different
interpretation in connection with the new technology. The levy would function the
same way, in many respects, as it did for compact disks and cassettes.
Finally, a word must be said about looking to the legislative history of this
provision. The Federal Court of Appeal seems convinced by the fact that, since the
levy was not targeted to hardware, then it cannot apply to the MP3 “device.” The
specific intent of the Legislature to capture certain known technologies at the time
of the rule’s drafting is not communicated through the dynamic language of s. 79,
and should therefore be of little relevance to the interpretation of a provision which
seems to contemplate unforeseen technologies. The question courts need to ask
themselves in such situations is whether the new technology fits within the concep-
tual content and purpose of the provision; and in respect of the latter, whether
newly affected interests need to be accommodated in the interpretation. The inclu-
sion of the MP3 player under the private copying levy, which is functionally
equivalent to compact disks and cassettes, is consistent with the language and pur-
pose of the private copy levy regime.
(c) Robertson v. Thomson Corp.
In this case, a freelance journalist sold articles to the Globe and Mail without
license or assignment in respect of the electronic rights.52 The Globe subsequently
published the articles in its print and online daily editions of the newspaper. The
legal controversy arose when the Globe also included the article in other digital
formats such as CD-ROMs and online Internet databases for which it charged fee
for service. The legal issue became whether conversion and reproduction of the
article (together with other news of the day) into these digital and electronic for-
mats involved the copyright of the freelance author, on the one hand, or the news-
paper as a collective work, on the other.53 The former characterization would ex-
pose the Globe to copyright infringement while the latter would merely be an
exercise of its legal rights in the collective work. At all three levels of judicial
decision, the outcome boiled down to the choice of perspective taken by the court.
One perspective is to view the digital uploading of each day’s paper edition
into the electronic archive as the act of reproducing the collective work. According
to this “input” perspective, the article itself is the same as the one that appears in
the newsprint version and identifies the Globe as its source, including the date of
52 One article was an excerpt from a book she had written for which her publisher author-
ized “one time usage” in exchange for a fee. The other article was purchased by oral
contract. Electronic rights were not addressed in either contract: see Robertson v.
Thomson Corp. (2001), 15 C.P.R. (4th) 147 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Robertson] at paras. 17-18,
affirmed 2004 CarswellOnt 4015 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal allowed 2005 Carswell-
Ont 1501, 2005 CarswellOnt 1502 (S.C.C.); reversed 2006 SCC 43, 2006 CarswellOnt
6182, 2006 CarswellOnt 6183 (S.C.C.).
53 A copyright subsists in a newspaper as a collective work when there is originality (skill
and judgment) exercised in the selection or arrangement of the work: see s. 2 of the
Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 2006 SCC 43, 274 D.L.R. (4th) 138 (S.C.C.) [Robertson]
at para. 37.
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publication, the page number and the headline. More significantly, the article is
“mechanically derived from a digitalized version of the deconstructed given edition
of the newspaper.”54 The skill and judgment of the collective work is maintained in
the digitized form of the newspaper as it is inputted in to the electronic archive. The
article is retrieved from this digitized version and appears as a stand-alone piece,
though this is really a convenience of the technology (i.e., the search function) that
does not go to the nature of the work. The underlying work remains a collective
work. In other words, the argument is that a substantial part of the daily newspaper,
as a collective work, is inputted into the databases; moreover, information identify-
ing it as such is entered for display to the user. The ability to view individual arti-
cles is a mere incident of technology, and should not serve to distinguish that which
is an individual work from that which is a collective work since to do so, would
violate the principle of media neutrality in section 3.
The competing “output” perspective is that determining which work is repro-
duced — the individual article or the collective work as a whole — turns on which
is actually displayed to the reader through the digitalized technology. Where
enough of the context of the newspaper can be displayed to the user, according to
the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada majority judgments, then it is
the collective work that is qualitatively being reproduced.55 However, when most
of the context of individual article is removed, e.g., only the name of the paper, the
date and page number are displayed with the article, then the collective work is not
maintained. The majority Supreme Court judgment held that “[w]e cannot avoid
comparing the original collective work with the finished collective work when de-
termining whether there has been a reproduction.”56 Specifically, enough of the
context of the collective work must be displayed as an output to the viewer to main-
tain the collective work nature of the newspaper. A CD-ROM that presents daily
newspapers that can be viewed separately and, when viewing a particular article,
displays other articles from that day’s edition in a column to the side, preserves
enough of the collective work context.57
This case illustrates very well the competing perspective of facts that can
emerge when Internet and digital technologies are applied to copyright law. What is
missing is a discussion about the context of section 3 rights under the Act, other
than the red herring of media neutrality as raised by the dissenting appellate jus-
tices.58 On first impression, one might correlate the “input” perspective with pro-
duction rights under section 3 as creating a new format or medium of a work in the
54 Robertson (Ont. S.C.J.), supra note 52, at para. 113.
55 See e.g., Robertson v. Thomson Corp. (2004), 34 C.P.R. (4th) 161, 72 O.R. (3d) 481,
¶67 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal allowed 2005 CarswellOnt 1501, 2005 CarswellOnt
1502 (S.C.C.); reversed 2006 CarswellOnt 6182, 2006 CarswellOnt 6183 (S.C.C.)
56 Robertson (SCC), supra note 53, at para. 46.
57 Ibid. at para. 52.
58 The majority Supreme Court judgment is quite right: “Media neutrality means that the
Copyright Act should continue to apply to different media, including more technologi-
cally advanced ones.” See ibid, at para. 49. In other words, no one disputes that digita-
lized productions and reproductions give rise to rights under the Act. The question is
who owns those rights. Media neutrality does not help us answer this question.
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first instance.59 Consider, for example section 3(1)(b) which specifies a right to
“convert” a dramatic work into a novel or other non-dramatic work.60 However, the
right to convert as a right to produce, which might suggest the very of act of digitiz-
ing information, is ultimately ambiguous in its meaning since the right presumes an
end product. In other words, the right to convert a play to a novel is a useless right
unless a play is ultimately produced and performed to an audience; analogically,
the produced play is like the display of the digitized newspaper to the database
user — the output perspective very much matters. The context of section 3 is ulti-
mately unhelpful as to which perspective of the facts or combination of facts re-
solves the interpretive ambiguity.
The interpretive exercise must then turn to striking the appropriate balance of
interests. While the dispute is between copyright holders, the outcome arguably has
an impact on access to and dissemination of copyrighted works. Abella, for exam-
ple, was explicit in identifying the public interest in access to archives as furthering
dissemination of works of copyright in support of her dissenting judgment.61
Equally, however, one could argue that the financial plight of freelance journalists
augurs for an interpretation favouring their interests so that they are afforded
greater opportunities for a viable living thus furthering the incentive to create. As
with many judgments which turn on a consideration of the rule’s purpose, it is
possible to come to opposite though equally compelling interpretive results.
One probably should not presume that courts will always take an output-based
perspective of the facts in similar cases. If a rogue database company were to copy
Globe online editions (for argument’s sake, let’s say the Globe has purchased the
electronic rights of all freelance authors) without permission and sell digitized ver-
sions of it, would a court seriously find that the Globe is without remedy since only
decontextualized versions of the articles are presented to readers? In those circum-
stances, we can be relatively certain that a court would find this to be copyright
infringement though the “losing” input perspective in Robertson would have to be
adopted to achieve this result.
CONCLUSION
This paper has presented an appropriate methodology for adapting the concep-
tual content of broadly conceived statutory rules to the advent of new technologies.
It is incumbent on interpreters of such rules to evolve meaning to embrace new
developments provided it is consistent with the conceptual content of the language,
a discernible legislative intent (as objectively determined from the context of the
statute), and the apparent purpose behind the law. But it is not just about interpret-
ing the law. New technologies present unique features, and even perspectives, that
must be identified and correlated to the meaning of rules as determined by this
methodology. Interpreters must be mindful of questions such as, what is the pur-
pose of this rule and are there features of the new technology that justify a devia-
tion from precedent interpretations? Does this new technology involve compelling
59 Following Théberge, it seems there is no separate meaning for production rights and
thus each court analyzes the case in connection with reproduction rights are involved.
60 Similarly, see s. 3(1)(c).
61 Robertson (SCC), supra note 53, at para. 69 ff.
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new interests that must be accommodated into the meaning of the rule? Notwith-
standing the dynamic nature of the methodology proposed in this paper, there are of
course limits to evolving meaning. So, for example, while a purpose of a rule can
be modified to accommodate new interests, it should not be fundamentally changed
nor should there be a disruptive unbalancing of the inherent interests to the rule.
Also, broad language has conceptual content that can only be stretched so far. It is
possible that a purpose or intent may support extending the application of a rule to
a new technology though the language of the provision cannot support the interpre-
tation. In such cases, interpreters should not exceed the conceptual content of the
language used. 
